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The Union interest:  
a hidden persuader?
JACQUES BOURGEOIS AND MERIJN CHAMON
I. Introduction
We are grateful for the honour of contributing to this Liber Amicorum. Ian Forrester’s 
prose and speech have always been elegant and on occasion, when needed, also barbed. 
In Court pleadings he once described the position taken by the European Commission 
and a gentleman.
with what used to be called the Community interest and should now be called the 
Union interest. While the notion plays a prominent role in the Commission’s assessment 
of complaints on alleged anti-competitive practices under Articles 101 or 102 TFEU 
and in decisions under the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), its function in these 
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II. The Union interest in the common 
commercial policy…
While the Union relies on several trade defence instruments in the CCP, we will limit 
ourselves to looking at the measures taken under the Anti-Dumping Regulation.1 Article 
5 of that Regulation provides that proceedings will be initiated following complaints 
on behalf of the domestic EU industry, while Articles 7 and 9 of the Regulation provide 
that even if the Commission indeed concludes there is dumping and injury, duties may 
that various interests (of domestic industry, users and consumers) need to be assessed 
to verify whether it is in the Union interest to intervene by adopting anti-dumping 
adopted when this is ‘clearly […] not in the Community interest.’  The wording, 
unaltered since the introduction of this provision in secondary EU law,2 is rather strange, 
needs to be shown, while in its third sentence intervention seems to be the default 
course of action unless the Union interest militates against it. In any event, regardless 
of whether the Union interest is implicitly assumed or whether it should be explicitly 
shown, it is a necessary pre-condition under the Anti-Dumping Regulation in order 
for the Commission to act. While the Regulation refers to various interests, it only 
refers to the economic interests of three groups (domestic industry producing the goods 
in question, domestic users of those goods, and consumers). The Union interest thus 
only appears to be the EU’s economic interest. 
III. Is different from the Union interest 
in the EU’s competition policy…
This is different for the notion of Union interest in the EU’s competition policy. Article 
7(2) of Regulation 1/2003 provides that any natural or legal person who can show a 
legitimate interest is entitled to lodge a complaint with the Commission for alleged 
violations of the competition rules laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. While 
the Commission is under a clear obligation to seriously examine every complaint with 
the necessary care,3  this does not amount to a duty to start investigations on every 
complaint received. The Commission’s discretion here is in large part covered by the 
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries 
not members of the European Community, OJ 2009 L 343/51.
No 3283/94 of 22 December 1994 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European 
Community, OJ 1994 L 349/1. Its wording was (and still is) virtually identical to the Commission’s original proposal. 
3 Judgment of 18 September 1992, Automec v. Commission, T-24/90, EU:T:1992:97, para. 78.
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notion of the Union interest,4 commanding the Commission only to pursue those cases 
if this is warranted by said interest. The Union interest is not referred to in Articles 
101 or 102 TFEU and, unlike the EU’s anti-dumping policy, neither is it developed in 
the secondary legislation giving effect to these provisions.5 Instead it has been elabo-
rated in the Commission’s enforcement practice and sanctioned by the General Court 
in the Automec II judgment6 and by the Court of Justice in the Ufex case,7 and the 
Commission has hence amply referred to it in its guidelines.8 Further, while the Union 
interest in the anti-dumping regime functions as a necessary precondition to act, the 
Union interest in competition enforcement is a merely optional ground on which the 
Commission can rely to justify its decision not to investigate a complaint. Lastly, the 
Union interest in competition policy seems to be a broader notion than the notion in 
the EU’s trade policy. While the latter, as noted, refers to various interests, the appre-
ciation of the Union interest predominantly appears to require the Commission to 
assess the effects of an anti-dumping measure on all relevant market operators. 
This of course has to do with the economic ambiguity of anti-dumping measures: while 
All these interests, however, are economic interests. This is different for the Union 
interest in competition policy where the Commission has inter alia9
following criteria relevant in its assessment: (i) the possibility for the complainant to 
bring an action before a national court; (ii) the duration and extent of the alleged 
anti-competitive behaviour as well as its effect on competition in the EU; (iii) the 
therefor; (v) the stage of the investigation and whether the alleged infringement has 
ceased or where the undertakings concerned have made commitments, etc.10 Some of 
4 For a more extensive discussion of the reasons for rejecting complaints, see Luis Ortiz Blanco (ed.), EU Competiton 
Procedure, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 558 et. seq.
5 Regulation 1/2003 does refer once to the Community interest in the 18th recital of its preamble. However, that 
not actually provided for. See Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of 
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L 1/1.
6 Judgment in, Automec v. Commission, footnote 3 above, EU:T:1992:97, op. cit.
7 Judgment in Ufex v. Commission, C-119/97 P, EU:C:1999:116.
8 See e.g., European Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 
82 of the EC Treaty, OJ 2004 C 101/65.
9 
10 Ibid., para. 44.
60 Ian S. Forrester  |  A Scot without Borders - Liber Amicorum - Volume I
  GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Union interest: a hidden persuader?
IV. But both may conceal ‘hidden 
persuaders’
the notion of Union interest may have such different interpretations, especially given 
frameworks in which the notion functions are strikingly similar: market operators 
lodging a complaint at the Commission for competition-distorting practices. Subscribing 
11 the lack 
of coherence between these two distinct but related areas indeed seems one of those 
‘gaps’, ‘blind spots’ or exceptions in an otherwise perfectionist EU legalism.12 While 
we would not qualify it as an element in the perfection-seeking dynamics of EU law, 
we suggest that the two notions of Union interest may still share a similarity, having 
the function, in the decision-making process, of a hidden persuader.
The term hidden persuader was originally coined by Vance Packard in his discussion 
of the use of psychological techniques to engineer consumer preferences,13 and takes 
up a slightly different function in our present argument. The working hypothesis 
proposed here is that the Union interest functions as an obscure criterion, determining 
the outcome in a procedure resulting from a complaint on either dumping or anti-
competitive behaviour. The Union interest may be a hidden persuader in anti-dumping 
decisions in the sense that its formal assessment may cover only part of what leads to 
a decision not to impose anti-dumping duties or to impose lower ones than would 
actually be needed to remove the injury.14 In competition law, the Commission’s reliance 
on the Union interest may be a hidden persuader in the sense that the Commission may 
opt to reject a complaint for lack of Union interest, pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 
773/2004,15 rather than on grounds relating to the intrinsic merits of the complaint.16 
The Commission would have reason to do so because the legal review of such a decision 
evidence of anti-competitive behaviour. In addition, it is doubtful that a Commission 
decision rejecting a complaint for lack of Union interest is a decision within the meaning 
of Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 that is binding on national competition authorities 
(NCAs). Yet under our working hypothesis, the Commission would indeed consider 
that such a rejection decision pre-empts intervention by NCAs much the same way as 
11 Jacco Bomhoff, ‘Perfectionism in European Law’, (2012) 14 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, p. 
83.
12 Ibid., p. 99.
13 Packard, The Hidden Persuaders, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1962.
14
15 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission 
pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ 2004 L 123/18.
16 supra
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rules. While the pre-emption in such a case would not be complete, an NCA would 
only have the possibility to apply national competition law and then only in so far as 
its decision does not contradict that of the Commission.17 
V. Identifying the hidden persuader 
in practice
The embryonic argument presented above should not be interpreted as a contention 
that the Commission relies on the notion of Union interest to hide a détournement de 
pouvoir. Instead, it is argued that the discretion afforded to the Commission under that 
notion should be delineated more precisely, something which does not even necessarily 
imply a restriction of the Commission’s discretion.
1. The common commercial policy
It is also precisely this discretion which makes the persuader hidden and hard to reveal 
Fediol.18 In that 1988 case, the European association of seed crushers and oil processors 
challenged the Commission’s decision not to impose duties against soy imports from 
have been in the Community’s interests. At that time however, the Anti-Dumping 
Regulation19 only provided that the Community interest needed to be taken into account 
provisional duties. Fediol relied on these provisions and an a contrario reasoning to 
argue that the Commission could then not invoke the Community interest to simply 
terminate proceedings.20 The Court however noted that ‘although it is true that the 
Commission is under a duty to establish objectively the facts concerning the existence 
of subsidization practices and of injury caused thereby to Community undertakings, 
it has a very wide discretion to decide, in terms of the interests of the Community, 
whether or not to terminate the proceeding.’21 
As noted above, the current Article 21 of the Anti-dumping Regulation now expounds 
on the Union interest but in a rather vague manner. While the Commission’s bureaucratic 
interest is not explicitly recognized as coming under that Union interest, it may well 
17 See  Judgment in Toshiba Corporation e.a.
18 Judgment in Fediol v. Commission
19 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 of 23 July 1984 on protection against dumped or subsidized imports from 
countries not members of the European Economic Community, OJ 1984 L 201/1.
20 Judgment in Fediol v. Commission  op. cit
21 
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be a legitimate interest to take up in the equation. The same goes for the EU’s general 
interests in its external relations, especially in light of Article 21 TEU and the necessary 
coherence in its external action: does it not follow from this Treaty provision that the 
EU’s decision in the CCP should take into account the EU’s general objectives in its 
external relations? One could even apply this to the Fediol case of 1988, since in 1985 
Brazil had just transitioned to a civilian government. Since the EU is now under a duty 
to advance democracy ‘in the wider world’ would it not be advisable to refrain from 
imposing duties on a frail democracy, even if from a purely economic perspective such 
This question has so far been kept off the table. In its 2006 green paper on trade defence 
instruments, the Commission proposed to come to a more transparent (re-)weighing 
of the industry/users/consumers’ interests, further suggesting to take into account other 
interests (such as the impact on the EU’s development policy),22 but the reform process 
failed. In the currently pending review process,23
that the ‘Union interest test ensures that the overall economic interests of the EU are 
considered before measures are imposed’24 while further suggesting to adopt guidelines 
on the Union interest test.25 While such guidelines would be welcome from a transpa-
rency perspective, the basic features of the Union interest test should still be laid down 
in legislation, in light of Article 290 TFEU, if they are to be considered as essential 
elements in the EU’s trade defence policy.
Apart from these legitimate economic interests, linked to the objectives of the EU, 
be seized to address wider policy interests that are now playing a role of hidden 
persuaders in the decision-making process. Above, it was noted that despite there being 
injurious dumping and Union interest, the duties imposed may be lower than the injury 
margin. Member States which are represented in the Advisory Committee might not 
share the Commission’s view on the Union interest. Rather than meeting these Member 
States’ concerns and reviewing its assessment of the Union interest, the Commission 
could then simply opt to change the level of the duty as a compromise. 
22 
23 
24 European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal on the modernisation of trade defence 
25 iuncto
63
  GO TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
Ian S. Forrester  |  A Scot without Borders - Liber Amicorum - Volume I
Jacques Bourgeois and Merijn Chamon
26 However, 
has been integrated in the general comitology regime,27 should place a special responsi-
bility on the Commission, guardian of the common European interest, to ensure duties 
are imposed (or not) in line with the Union interest.
The Union interest as employed by the Commission in anti-dumping proceedings 
should be subject to a more profound debate. It should for instance be explored whether 
the Union interest in some cases might require the Commission not to impose measures, 
even if this would make sense from a purely economic view. While this could sound 
like blasphemy to some, it should be repeated that the CCP is not an island, detached 
from the EU’s general objectives and its duties to contribute to a prosperous, stable 
common Union interest and does not serve to hide purely national 
interests. For this, the elimination of the Council’s role in the adoption of anti-dumping 
measures would serve as a stepping stone.
2. The EU’s competition policy
As explained above, the hidden-persuader function of the Union interest in competition 
law seems different from its function in the CCP. Indeed, while the latter requires 
afforded pursuant to that notion. 
Today the Union interest has become the key concept in the Commission’s decisional 
practice.28
endedness. The criteria composing the Union interest29 therefore do not constitute an 
cherry-pick amongst the criteria in the motivation of its decisions rejecting a complaint 
for lack of Union interest.30 While this large, judicially-sanctioned discretion is very 
interesting for the Commission, it should be equally clear that it is less so for the 
26 
Journal of World Trade
see Ivo Van Bael & Jean-François Bellis, EU anti-dumping and other trade defence instruments, Alphen aan den 
Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2011, pp. 401-408.
27 This was eventually done through Regulation (EU) No 37/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 January 2014 amending certain regulations relating to the common commercial policy as regards the procedures 
for the adoption of certain measures, OJ 2014 L 18/1. The post-Lisbon rules on comitology are laid down in 
Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the 
rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise 
of implementing powers, OJ 2011 L 55/13. For a discussion of the reduced executive function of the Council, see 
i.a. Claude Blumann, ‘Un Nouveau Départ Pour la Comitologie : le Règlement n° 182/2011 du 16 février 2011’, 
(2011) 47 Cahiers de droit européen 1, pp. 35-36; Paul Craig, ‘Delegated Acts, Implementing Acts and the New 
Comitology Regulation’, (2011) 36 European Law Review 5, pp. 685-686.
28 Lorenzo Federico Pace, European Antitrust Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2007, p
29 See supra
30 See i.a IECC v. Commission
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individual complainant. Certainly, the latter would be better off if the Commission 
were required to exercise its far-reaching material discretion in a more structured 
fashion. Exactly this argument was made in the Ufex case on appeal by the appellants 
who argued that in Automec II, the Court of First Instance had ruled that ‘[t]he 
as regards the functioning of the common market, the probability of establishing the 
existence of the infringement and the scope of the investigation required in order to 
are complied with.’31 They inferred from this that those criteria should all be looked at 
by the Commission before taking a decision on the Union interest and that the criteria 
could ‘only be supplemented according to the circumstances by other particulars of 
the case.’32 Otherwise, the appellants argued, the Union interest would ‘become a vague 
33
The Court however noted that accepting such an argument ‘would rigidify the case-
law.’34 And as a result the notion of Union interest remains a very malleable concept 
in the hands of the Commission. While the Court cannot be faulted with its rejection 
of the appellant’s argument in Ufex
criteria to be taken into account to determine the Union interest, there nonetheless 
remains scope for requiring the Commission to follow a more structured approach in 
its assessment. 
Watch repairers case, the Commission had 
alleged anti-competitive practices. The Commission had invoked four reasons to this 
end: (i) the market concerned was of limited size, (ii) the Commission could not 
establish the existence of an agreement or concerted practice, (iii) no dominant position 
in the market could be found (and hence the question of abuse did not pose itself) and 
(iv) there would be little likelihood to establish an infringement of competition rules.35 
However, these considerations were to a great extent linked, and depended on the 
the Court found that the Commission had erred on the latter point, the Commission’s 
rejection based on lack of Union interest collapsed like a house of cards.36 In addition, 
the Watch repairers case also set at least one further limit to the discretion of the 
Commission when assessing the Union interest: whereas it is accepted that the 
31 Judgment in Automec v. Commission op. cit
32 Judgment in Ufex v. Commission op. cit
33 
34 
35 CEAHR v. Commission
36 
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Commission may refer to the possibility to bring proceedings at the national level, if 
in casu 
37 
Does the Union interest then not also impose a special responsibility on the Commission? 
The decentralization of the enforcement of competition rules following Regulation 
1/2003 also warrants a renewed look at the concept of the Union interest. In those 
cases where the Commission rejects a complaint for lack of Union interest, the 
complainant should indeed have the possibility to turn to the national competition 
authority, in accordance with the decentralization which Regulation 1/2003 puts in 
place. The latter’s presence in the European Competition Network, together with the 
If the Commission follows a structured approach in its assessment, the complainant 
appreciate the reasons behind a rejection if the Commission continues to apply the 
current concept of Union interest. In addition it may undermine the Commission’s 
legitimacy if parties might believe that the Commission relies on the malleable concept 
of Union interest all too freely and that it in reality may have had other reasons for 
rejecting a complaint.
Again transparency is an issue here as well. The Commission’s Annual reports on 
Competition Policy are not as voluminous as they used to be, and in the past the 
Commission only reported on the number of complaints received and the number of 
complaints rejected, without specifying whether it did so by relying on the (then) 
Community interest.38 Furthermore, we have reached out to several NCAs querying 
whether market operators had lodged complaints with them following a rejection 
in those Member States proved to be very disparate and overall lacking in transparency. 
In all, the impression is that the potential of the concept of Union interest as a mechanism 
to come to an effective and transparent division of labour within the European Compe-
tition Network (ECN) is not being realized.
Taking the example of cooperation within the ECN: if the Commission rejects a 
complaint for lack of Union interest, because the conduct complained of is largely 
functioning of the internal market, should the Commission not link this by default to 
the criterion whereby an NCA is better placed to conduct investigations? The NCA in 
invoke the lack of Union interest to reject a complaint itself. While the Commission 
37 Judgment in CEAHR v. Commission op. cit
38 
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has rightly noted that a rejection of a complaint at national level does not mean that 
39 this should then surely work both 
ways. The fact that a complaint was rejected for want of Union interest could never 
as such be invoked by an NCA. This was also recently recognized by the Belgian 
Competition Authority in the Spira
as an ‘important argument’.40 It should be clear that whether this is the case depends 
on the quality of the Commission’s reasoning and how it relies on the Union interest 
in its assessments. 
Precisely this issue was also contested in the Spira case before the General Court,41 
but the latter followed its traditional approach to scrutinizing the Commission’s 
assessment of the Union interest. The fact that the practices complained of had an 
Union interest. While the Court is evidently right on this point, an approach such as 
the one taken in the Watch repairers case might have resulted in special scrutiny by 
the Court: because the Commission would be the best-placed competition authority, 
it must be very sure that there is no Union interest, since recourse to the NCAs would 
not be a genuine alternative.
The Union interest as used by the Commission in its enforcement of Competition rules 
should be subject to a more profound debate. It should for instance be explored whether 
the Union interest in some cases requires the Commission to act, like in the CCP, 
instead of allowing the Commission not to (further) act (on complaints). The Union 
consideration.
VI. Concluding remarks  
In the Common Commercial Policy and in Competition Policy, the notion of Union 
interest plays an important role. While one might think that the Union interest in both 
different even if there may be a sting to both. 
However, in the ever self-perfecting EU legal order, greater coherence between these 
notions is possible and worthy of pursuing. A more profound debate on the Union 
genuine Union interest, expelling such hidden 
persuaders as may exist now that are alien to it. Depending on the case, the Union 
interest might then require the Commission to act or refrain from acting. In both the 
39 
40 Decision, nr.BMA-2015-P/K-08 of 25 March 2015, para. 103 (http://economie.fgov.be/nl/binaries/BMA-2015-PK-08_
PUB%20_tcm325-265454.pdf).
41 Judgment of 11 July 2013 Spira v. Commission, joined cases T-108/07 and T-354/08, EU:T:2013:367, para. 
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Greater transparency in the Commission’s reliance on the Union interest would then 
also be in the interest of market operators, allowing them to better understand the 
Commission’s reasoning and to make a more considered assessment of their case before 
